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Abstract
The use of propensity score methods for program evaluation with non-experimental data typically requires
the propensity score be estimated, often with a model whose specification is unknown. While theoretical
results suggest that estimators utilizing more flexible propensity score specifications perform better, this
has not filtered into applied research. Here, we provide Monte Carlo evidence indicating the benefits of
over-specifying the propensity score when using weighting estimators, as well as using normalized weights.
We illustrate these results with an application assessing the environmental effects of GATT/WTO mem-
bership. We find that membership has a mixed impact, and that under-fitting the propensity score yields
misleading inference in several cases.
JEL Classifications: C21, C52, F18
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1 Introduction
Estimation methods utilizing the propensity score (i.e., the probability of an observation receiving a par-
ticular treatment conditional on covariates) are widely used in economics, as well as other disciplines, in
the evaluation of programs or interventions. In the majority of applications, the true propensity score is
unknown, and therefore must be estimated. Even in the case when the true propensity score is known,
Hahn (1998) and Hirano et al. (2003) show that using the true propensity score is inefficient. However,
there are few guidelines for applied researchers on how to proceed in the estimation of the propensity
score. In particular, there are two inter-related specification issues that arise when estimating the propen-
sity score in practice. First, one must decide which variables are to be included in the propensity score
model. Second, one must decide if higher order terms (and/or interaction terms) are to be included as
well. A third specification issue, the choice of the actual model itself (e.g., probit, logit, nonparametric,
etc.), is not the focus of the present paper.
As noted in Smith and Todd (2005) and the references therein, using too crude of a propensity score
specification is likely to yield biased estimates of the causal effect of the treatment. However, the inclusion
of irrelevant variables in the propensity score model may have a similar impact. Bryson et al. (2002)
argue against the inclusion of irrelevant variables on efficiency grounds; the variance of the treatment
effect estimator is likely to increase. Brookhart et al. (2006) suggest that variables related to the outcome
of interest should always be included in the propensity score specification, but variables only weakly
related to the outcome – even if strongly related to treatment assignment – should be excluded as their
inclusion results in higher mean squared error of the treatment effect estimate. Zhao (2005, p.15) argues
that while including irrelevant variables will not bias estimates of the treatment effects, over-fitting the
propensity score model (i.e., including irrelevant higher order terms) may be “counterproductive,” although
“in practice, this point may not be important.” Rubin and Thomas (1996) argue in favor of including
variables in the propensity score model unless there is consensus that they do not belong. Lastly, the
intuition behind the result in Hirano et al. (2003) that using the true propensity score is inefficient even
when it is known suggests that over-fitting the propensity score model may have little negative consequence
on the properties of treatment effect estimates in practice.
To date, the most common approach used by applied researchers to address specification issues with
respect to the propensity score is to conduct balancing tests in studies using the propensity score as a
means to implement matching or stratification estimators. If a variable is found not to be balanced, the
usual approach is re-specify the propensity score model adding (additional) higher order terms and/or
interactions (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba 1999). However, there is no single, universally accepted balancing
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test (Smith and Todd 2005). Recently, Shaikh et al. (2005) develop an alternative test for misspecification
of the propensity score, although investigating the consequences of mis-specifying the propensity score due
to over-fitting is not a goal of the paper.
In light of this background, the aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we assess whether the practical
effects of mis-specifying the propensity score model through the exclusion of relevant higher order terms
and the inclusion of irrelevant higher order terms via a Monte Carlo study. Our study focuses on two
estimators of treatment effects: the (unnormalized) inverse probability weighted estimator of Horvitz and
Thompson (1952) and the normalized inverse probability weighted estimator of Hirano and Imbens (2001).
The results indicate that in many cases over-fitting the propensity score model results in a more efficient
estimator, and in the remaining cases does no worse than the correctly specified model.1 In addition,
in cases where the estimated propensity score often takes values close to zero or unity, the normalized
estimator of Hirano and Imbens (2001) outperforms the unnormalized estimator. Since the penalty for
over-fitting is minimal, this suggests that practitioners report a set of causal estimates corresponding to
various models of propensity scores.
The second goal of this study is to illustrate these ideas with a timely application related to the impact
of membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on environmental quality. Using cross-country
data from the 1990s, we find a detrimental impact of WTO membership on per capita carbon dioxide
emissions, and a beneficial impact of membership on energy consumption and access to clean water. The
unfavorable effect of the WTO on per capita carbon dioxide emissions is consonant with previous research
suggesting that the WTO may impede international cooperation on global environmental issues, while
the positive effect on local measures of environmental quality is consistent with previous research on the
beneficial effects of trade openness. In addition, the application illustrates the relative costlessness of
over-fitting the propensity score model.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the treatment effects
setup as well as the estimators analyzed. Section 3 describes the Monte Carlo study and results. Section
4 contains the WTO-environment application. Section 5 concludes.
2 Setup
Consider a random sample of N individuals from a large population indexed by i = 1, ..., N . As in the now
commonplace potential outcome framework (see, e.g., Neyman 1923; Fisher 1935; Roy 1951; Rubin 1974),
let Yi(t) denote the potential outcome of individual i under treatment t, t ∈ T . Here, we consider only the
1Similar results are found in Ichimura and Linton (2005), who use a kernel estimator to estimate propensity scores.
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case of binary treatments: T = {0, 1}. The causal effect of one treatment, say t = 1, relative to the other,
t = 0, is defined as the difference between the corresponding potential outcomes. Formally,
τ i = Yi(1)− Yi(0) (1)
and the population average treatment effect is given by
τ = E(τ i) = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)] (2)
For each individual, we observe the triple {Yi, Ti, Xi}, where Yi is the observed outcome, Ti is a binary
indicator of the treatment received, and Xi is a vector of covariates. The relationship between the potential
and observed outcomes is given by
Yi = TiYi(1) + (1− Ti)Yi(0) (3)
which makes clear that only one potential outcome is observed for any individual. As such, estimating τ
is not trivial as there is an inherent missing data problem, and some assumptions are required to proceed.
One such assumption is unconfoundedness or selection on observables (Heckman and Robb 1985). Under
this assumption, treatment assignment is said to be independent of potential outcomes conditional on the
set of covariates, X. As a result, selection into treatment is random conditional on X and the average effect
of the treatment can be obtained by comparing outcomes of individuals in different treatment states with
identical values of the covariates. To solve the dimensionality problem that is likely to arise ifX is a lengthy
vector, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose using the propensity score, P (x) = Pr(Ti = 1|Xi = x),
instead of X, as a conditioning variable.
Given knowledge of the propensity scores and sufficient overlap between the distributions of the propen-
sity scores across the t = 1 and t = 0 groups (typically referred to as the common support condition, see
Dehejia and Wahba (1999) or Smith and Todd (2005)), the average treatment effect can be estimated in
a number of ways (D’Agostino (1998) and Imbens (2004) offer summaries). Here, we focus on the inverse
probability weighted estimator of Horvitz and Thompson (1952), given by
τ = E
[
Y · T
P (X)
− Y · (1− T )
1− P (X)
]
(4)
We refer to (4) as the unnormalized estimator. A sample estimate of τ can be computed using estimated
propensity scores as follows:
τˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
YiTi
Pˆ (Xi)
− Yi(1− Ti)
1− Pˆ (Xi)
]
(5)
Alternatively, Hirano and Imbens (2001) propose an estimator that assigns weights normalized by the sum
of propensity scores for treated and untreated groups, instead of assigning equal weights of 1/N to each
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observation. Their estimator is given by
τˆnorm =
[
N∑
i=1
YiTi
Pˆ (Xi)
/
N∑
i=1
Ti
Pˆ (Xi)
]
−
[
N∑
i=1
Yi(1− Ti)
1− Pˆ (Xi)
/
N∑
i=1
(1− Ti)
1− Pˆ (Xi)
]
(6)
The advantage of estimator in (6), which we refer to as the normalized estimator, is that the weights
sum to unity within each group (Imbens et al. 2005). In addition, Imbens et al. (2005) show that
the normalized estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the unnormalized estimator and therefore is
asymptotically efficient.
This exposition shows that researchers face two issues in practice. First, since the propensity score
is typically unknown, this must be estimated, and theory offers little guidance. In fact, even when the
propensity score is known, using the true propensity score is inefficient in general (Robins and Rotnitzky
1995; Rubin and Thomas 1996; Hahn 1998; Hirano et al. 2003). Second, practitioners must decide between
the unnormalized Horvitz and Thompson (1952) estimator and the normalized Hirano and Imbens (2001)
estimator. Hirano et al. (2003) show that the estimator in (6) achieves the semiparametric efficiency bound
when the propensity scores are estimated using a Series Logit Estimator (SLE) (see Geman and Hwang,
1982) and propose a feasible variance estimator.
To help inform applied researchers, we assess the practical performance of the two estimators, (5)
and (6), as well as various specifications of the propensity score. With respect to the latter, we focus in
particular on whether it pays to over-specify the propensity score equation. We now turn to our Monte
Carlo study.
3 Monte Carlo Study
To compare the two estimators, as well as assess the benefit to over-specifying the propensity score equa-
tion, we simulate the treatment assignment based on a number of different, and increasingly difficult for
estimation, true models, and then compare the performance of the estimators in (5) and (6). For each of
the true models, we simulate 1,000 data sets. Each data set contains three variables for each of the 1,000
observations: Ti, a binary indicator of the treatment received, Yi, the outcome, and a single covariate, Xi.
X is randomly drawn from a U [0, 1] distribution. Simulation of the treatment assignment and outcome
are discussed below.
3.1 Treatment Assignment
To simulate treatment assignment, we first simulate the true propensity score, Pi, for each observation,
and then draw Ti from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter Pi. The propensity scores are simulated
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from nine distinct settings, ranging from continuous, smooth and monotone to non-continuous and non-
monotone. Thus, we compare the performance of the causal estimators using models for which SLE would
be expected to perform well (e.g. when propensity scores are simulated using a logit model), as well as
more difficult models (e.g. non-continuous propensity scores). The nine settings are:
1. Logit specification:
Pi =
exp(Ai)
1 + exp(Ai)
where Ai is
(a) Flat: Ai = 0
(b) Linear: Ai = −3 + 6Xi
(c) Quadratic & Symmetric: Ai = 2.5− (2.5(1− 2Xi))2
(d) Quadratic & Non-Symmetric: Ai = 2.5− (2.5(1− 1.5Xi))2
(e) Fourth degree: Ai = −2.5 + 4.5X4i
2. Peak
(a) Symmetric:
Pi =
 0.05 + 1.8Xi if Xi < 0.51.85− 1.8Xi if Xi ≥ 0.5
(b) Non-Symmetric:
Pi =
 0.05 + 1.125Xi if Xi < 0.84.55− 4.5Xi if Xi ≥ 0.8
3. Step
(a) Monotonic
Pi =

0.33 if Xi < 0.33
0.50 if Xi ∈ [0.33, 0.67)
0.67 if Xi ≥ 0.67
(b) Non-Monotonic:
Pi =

0.50 if Xi < 0.33
0.90 if Xi ∈ [0.33, 0.67)
0.10 if Xi ≥ 0.67
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While the relationships between the propensity scores and covariate are continuous and smooth in all
the logit specifications, Specifications 1a, 1b, and 1e represent monotonic relationships and Specifications
1c and 1d are non-monotonic. In addition, Specification 1e is also asymmetric. Specifications 2a and 2b,
on the other hand, represent non-smooth, but continuous, relationships, while Specifications 3a and 3b
represent non-continuous relationships. The propensity scores are presented in Figure 1. Note that all
specifications satisfy the common support condition.
3.2 Outcome Equation
Outcomes are simulated using the following specification:
Yi = β1 + β2Ti + β3Xi + β4TiXi + εi, (7)
where εi ∼ N(0, σ2). To decide on the values of the parameters, we use the data from Lalonde (1986).
Specifically, we estimate (7) using this data, where X represents the first principal component of the set of
the covariates used in Deheija and Wahba (1999). The values of β = {βj}4j=1 are [2.54, -1.67, -2.47, 1.96],
and σ2 = 0.25.
3.3 Estimation and Evaluation
3.3.1 Estimation
For each data set, we estimate the propensity scores using a SLE. Following Hirano et al. (2003), we
estimate the propensity scores as
P̂ (x) =
exp [RK(X)′δ̂K ]
1 + exp [RK(X)′δ̂K ]
where RK(X) is a vector of length K with the jth element equal to RKj (x) = X
(j−1), j = 1, . . . ,K, and
δ̂ is the vector of maximum likelihood estimates. For each true model, we use K = 1, . . . , 10. Hence, we
estimate ten logit models with increasing degree of polynomial in the logit function.
The variance is computed as in Hirano et al. (2003, p. 1172). Specifically,
Vˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ψˆi + αˆi)
2, (8)
where
ψˆ =
YiTi
Pˆ (Xi)
− Yi(1− Ti)
1− Pˆ (Xi)
− τˆ ,
and
αˆi = −
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
YiTi
Pˆ (Xi)2
+
Yi(1− Ti)
(1− Pˆ (Xi))2
)
RK(Xi)
]′
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×
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
RK(Xi)RK(Xi)′
)−1
RK(Xi)(Ti − Pˆ (Xi)).
3.3.2 Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the estimators, we report the average bias, mean squared error (MSE),
estimated variance, and percent coverage of the 95% confidence interval. In addition, we compute two
measures of fit of the estimated propensity scores to the true propensity scores, namely, mean integrated
squared error (MISE)
MISE =
1
M
M∑
j=1
[
Pˆ (Zj)− P (Zj)
]2
and sup-norm
SUP = sup
z∈[0,1]
|Pˆ (Zj)− P (Zj)|
where P (·) and Pˆ (·) are the true and estimated propensity scores, respectively, evaluated at a grid of M
points in [0, 1] interval (M equals 100 in the study). Lower values of both measures represent a better fit.
Finally, we report the semiparametric efficiency bound for each true model; see the appendix for derivation.
3.4 Results
The results are presented in Table 1. Panel I contains the results using Specification 1a for the propensity
score. Here, the true propensity score is flat, implying treatment is random (independent of X). This
specification provides a nice check as we expect all models to perform equally well. The results are as
expected; the biases are small and equal for both causal estimators, τ̂ and τ̂norm, and the MSEs, as well as
the variance estimator, converge to the efficiency bound. However, some interesting results are observed
even in this case. First, both measures of fit of the estimated propensity scores are minimized when the
correct model is used (logit with zero degree polynomial), but MSEs and variance are higher than in over-
fitted models. As a result, the coverage rate is above 95% in the first column, and above the rest of the
estimated models. This result is closely related to the findings in Hirano et al. (2003), since the estimated
propensity score using zero degree polynomial is exactly the true propensity score.
The results for the linear model (Specification 1b) are presented in Panel II, and are similar to Panel
I. Specifically, biases and MSEs are high in the under-fitted model, but settle down quickly, with little
penalty in terms of MSE and coverage rates for over-fitting. In addition, there is little difference between
the unnormalized and normalized estimators.
Panel III contains the results for the symmetric quadratic model (Specification 1c). Here, the results are
very surprising, indicating equally good performance in under-fitted, correct, and over-fitted models. This
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arises because the true propensity score is symmetric. To see this, suppose that the marginal distribution
of X is U [0, 1] and the propensity score is symmetric about E[X], which is 1/2. Further, note that when
the estimated propensity score is constant across observations (i.e. we utilize a zero degree polynomial),
(4) is equivalent to the simple difference in means estimator, given by
τˆ s =
1
N1
N∑
i=1
YiTi − 1
N0
N∑
i=1
Yi(1− Ti) (9)
where N1 (N0) is the size of the treatment (control) group. The first component in (9) is the mean
of the T = 1 observations, and will have mean (and converge in probability to) E[Y |T = 1]. Now,
E[Y |T = 1] = E[E[Y |T = 1, X]|T = 1] = ∫ E[Y |T = 1, X = x]p(x|T = 1)dx, where p(x|T = 1) is the
conditional density of X given T = 1, which by Bayes’ rule is p(x|T = 1) = p(T = 1|x)p(T = 1)/p(x).
Since E[Y |T = 1, X = x] = (β1 + β2) + (β3 + β4)x, it follows that
E[Y |T = 1] =
∫
(β1 + β2) + (β3 + β4)xp(x|T = 1)dx
= (β1 + β2) + (β3 + β4)
∫
xp(x|T = 1)dx
= (β1 + β2) + (β3 + β4) E[X|T = 1].
Furthermore, since p(T = 1|x) is symmetric about 1/2, it follows that p(x|T = 1) is symmetric about 1/2.
Thus, E[X|T = 1] = 1/2 = E[X] and E[Y |T = 1] = (β1 + β2) + (β3 + β4) E[X] = E[Y (1)]. A similar
argument follows for the T = 0 case. As a result, the simple estimator in (9) is unbiased and consistent in
this case.2
The results are markedly different for the asymmetric quadratic model (Specification 1d); results are
shown in Panel IV. The biases and MSEs are very high for under-fitted models (columns 1 and 2), with
low penalty, in terms of MSE, for over-fitted models. In addition, the estimator using normalized weights
performs better in the over-fitted models in terms of biases, MSEs, and coverage rates.
The results for the final logit specification, polynomial of forth degree (Specification 1e), are not sur-
prising; results are given in Panel V. First, relatively extreme under-fitting (columns 1 and 2) leads to
very poor performance by both estimators. Second, there is little penalty for over-fitting the propensity
score. Finally, there is little difference between the unnormalized and normalized estimators in over-fitted
models.
The remaining results pertain to data simulated from non-logit true models. As a result, there is
no correct model. Results for the symmetric peak model (Specification 2a) are given in Panel VI. As
in the previous symmetric specifications (1a and 1c), we find little substantive differences across models.
2The authors are indebted to Keisuke Hirano for this argument.
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However, the biases, MSEs, and coverage probabilities improve using with the normalized estimator due to
a large number of estimated propensity score close to zero or unity. On the other hand, in the asymmetric
peak model (Specification 2b), we find obvious benefits to over-fitting the propensity score, as well as little
substantive difference between the unnormalized and normalized estimators (Panel VII).
The final set of results uses data simulated using non-continuous propensity scores. Results for the
monotonic step function (Specification 3a) are shown in Panel VIII, and indicate that all models, as well as
both estimators, perform equally well with the exception of the zero degree polynomial logit model. More
interesting results arise with the non-monotonic (asymmetric) step function (Specification 3b); results are
displayed in Panel IX. First, there is little penalty in terms of bias and MSE for over-fitting, particularly
with the normalized estimator. Second, the benefits of using the normalized – relative to the unnormalized
– estimator are extremely pronounced: biases and MSEs are lower in most models. This occurs due to the
fact that one-third of the true propensity scores are close to zero, and normalized weights attenuate the
effect of the small values of the estimated propensity scores in the denominator.
In sum, the results of the Monte carlo study yield three salient implications. First, there is almost
no penalty for over-fitting the propensity score model and often a large penalty for under-fitting. Since
in practice researchers rarely know the true form of the propensity score, it appears prudent to over-fit.
Specifically, in cases where the true propensity score is symmetric (and not flat), there is little benefit
(and little cost) to over-fitting. Conversely, in all asymmetric cases, with the exception of an asymmetric,
non-continuous, and monotonic, propensity score (Specification 3a), over-fitting is beneficial. Second, when
a relatively large number of estimated propensity scores lie close to zero or unity, the normalized estimator
performs better, performing relatively poorly only when propensity scores are under-fitted. Thus, over-
fitting in combination with the normalized estimator seems wise. Finally, whether or not the true propensity
score is continuous or not does not appear to affect the performance of the different estimators and different
models used to estimate the propensity score. Based on these results, practitioners ought to use the
normalized estimator and provide a series of estimates using increasingly sophisticated specifications of the
propensity score model. We illustrate this approach with a timely application assessing the environmental
effects of the GATT/WTO.
4 Application
4.1 Motivation
Copeland and Taylor (2004, p. 7) state that “for the last ten years environmentalists and the trade policy
community have engaged in a heated debate over the environmental consequences of liberalized trade.”
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Given the stakes involved, Taylor (2004, p. 1) argues that this constitutes “one of the most important
debates in trade policy.” The debates become even more heated when one focuses on the interplay between
the WTO and the environment, as evidenced by the political demonstrations at the WTO Ministerial
Meetings in Seattle in 1999. As noted on CNN’s website3: “Opponents of the WTO claim it puts too much
control into the hands of government and big business. They believe international trade agreements do not
often take into account the impact on the health and safety of workers, the damage to the environment and
the welfare of poorer nations.” On the other hand, Mark Vaile, Australia’s trade minister told CNN in the
same article: “On both the labor standards and the environment there are very clear and demonstrable
benefits that can flow from improved trade and trade liberalization across the world to those sectors –
particularly in the developing world.” Weinstein and Charnovitz (2001, p. 147) state: “[T]he WTO has
started to develop an environmental conscience. With only a few tweaks, it can turn greener still... The
organization is in fact developing constructive principles for accommodating both trade and environmental
concerns.”
In large part, the disagreement between WTO proponents and environmentalists stems from the com-
plex relationship between trade and the environment in general, and the WTO and the environment in
particular. Specifically, there are a number of avenues via which the WTO may affect the environment.
First, the WTO may increase the volume of trade through the relaxation of barriers to trade, and the
increase in trade may help or harm the environment. With respect to the impact of the WTO (and its
predecessor, the GATT) on trade, Rose (2004a, 2004b, 2005) finds surprisingly little significant associa-
tion between the WTO and liberal trade policy and only moderate evidence on expanded trade volumes.
Moreover, even if the WTO does liberalize trade, the impact of trade on the environment is also not clear.
Recent evidence in Antweiler et al. (2001), Frankel and Rose (2005), Chintrakarn and Millimet (2006),
and others find little, if any, evidence of a detrimental effect of trade on various measures of environmental
quality.4
Second, several provisions in the WTO may impede a country’s ability to unilaterally enact trade-
related measures designed to protect the environment.5 The pillars of the WTO framework – the principles
of Most Favored Nation (MFN) and national treatment – require that any advantage extended one WTO
member country be extended to ‘like products’ from all member countries and that imported goods be
treated no less favorably by internal taxes and domestic regulations than ‘like’ domestic products. Relevant
for environmental policy, WTO dispute settlement rulings typically fail to consider differences in process
3See http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/globaljustice/seattle.html.
4See Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a review of the literature.
5See Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. (2006) for an excellent summary of the relevant jurisprudence.
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and production methods (PPMs) in determining likeness. Thus, countries have been unable to discriminate
against goods on the basis of non-product related PPMs (Atlhammer and Dro¨ge 2003). This is particularly
relevant for environmental policy since many trade-related environmental measures discriminate on the ba-
sis of characteristics of the producer which fail to alter the final product. That said, Article XX allows for
a number of exceptions, including trade restrictions “necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life”
or “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources”. However, exceptions are limited by the
chapeau of Article XX, requiring trade measures to not constitute “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade”. In practice, prior to the US-Shrimp/Turtle 21.5 (2001) dispute resolution, whereby a revised
U.S. ban on shrimp imports from countries not adequately protecting against the accidental killing of sea
turtles in the harvesting of shrimp was upheld after a previous U.S. ban had been determined to violate
the chapeau, environmental policies focused on non-product related PPMs had been deemed inconsistent
with the WTO; now the door is open (Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. 2006). DeSombre and Barkin (2002,
p. 17) state: “The recent ruling on the shrimp/turtle issue represents the first time that a DSM [Dispute
Settlement Mechanism] ruling has clearly supported a breach of international trade rules for the purpose
of environmental protection.” Thus, while complex, there is room in the WTO provisions for unilateral
trade restrictions on the basis of non-product related, environmentally hazardous PPMs.
Third, the WTO provisions discussed above may impede the efficacy and/or viability of multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) in two ways (Atlhammer and Dro¨ge 2003). First, MEAs typically rely
on the voluntary cooperation of countries to abide by a treaty’s obligations. In the event of non-compliance,
trade restrictions are a useful enforcement mechanism. However, if the offending party is a WTO member,
such restrictions may be disallowed. Second, trade restrictions on countries opting not to sign or ratify
a particular MEA may limit free-riding, but again may not be allowed under the WTO system. Thus,
WTO provisions may make it much more difficult to get an MEA adopted, or to enforce an existing MEA.
Eckersley (2004, p. 27) investigates these claims, arguing that the threat of challenges under the WTO has
had a “chilling effect” on MEA negotiations and imposition of trade restrictions under existing MEAs.
Finally, the WTOmay provide a framework, as argued in Bagwell and Staiger (2001a, 2001b), to handle
issues such as a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ or ‘regulatory chill’ in environmental (or labor) standards. Specifically,
countries can potentially compensate domestic import-competing firms for higher (lower) domestic (foreign)
standards by raising tariffs so that market access remains constant. In the end, then, the impact of the
GATT/WTO on the environment is a priori ambiguous, and requires empirical analysis.
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4.2 Data
The data are at the country-level and come from Frankel and Rose (2005); thus, we provide only limited
details.6 We analyze five measures of environmental quality: per capita carbon dioxide emissions, the
average annual deforestation rate from 1990 – 1996, energy depletion, rural access to clean water, and
urban access to clean water. We employ three covariates in the first-stage propensity score equation,
following Frankel and Rose (2005): real per capita GDP, land area per capita, and a measure of the
democratic structure of the government. Finally, we supplement the data from Frankel and Rose (2005)
with an indicator of whether the country is a GATT/WTO member. In the analysis, we use observations
from 1990 (prior to the WTO) and 1995 (after the creation of the WTO). Table 2 provides summary
statistics and descriptions of the variables.
4.3 Results
The results are presented in Table 3. For each outcome, we estimate 19 specifications to assess the impact
of over-fitting the propensity score equation. Specification (1) includes only a constant in the propensity
score equation. Each successive specification then adds the variable listed in the second column. Thus,
specification (4) includes a constant and a linear term for each of the three covariates. Specification (7)
((10)) includes a constant as well as linear and squared (and cubic) terms for each of the three covariates.
Finally, specification (19) corresponds to a third order linear approximation. Within each specification, we
display the unnormalized and normalized treatment effect estimate, as well as the standard error.7
For per capita carbon dioxide, the various results indicate three salient findings. First, there are large
differences between the unnormalized and normalized estimates in all specifications except for (1); the
unnormalized estimates are typically twice as large and are therefore much more likely to be statistically
significant. Second, there are large differences in both the unnormalized and normalized estimates when
moving from a linear specification of the propensity score to adding higher order terms. However, over-
fitting – even relative to specification (5) that includes a quadratic term for only one of the three covariates
– does not qualitatively alter the results. Thus, while there is little benefit in this case to over-fitting, there
is no cost either. Finally, in terms of the actual point estimates, we find moderately statistically significant
evidence that GATT/WTOmembership raises per capita carbon dioxide emissions (τ = 1.69; τnorm = 0.91;
standard error = 0.52). This is consistent with the results in Frankel and Rose (2005) assessing the impact
of trade openness on per capita carbon dioxide, as well as the argument that the GATT/WTO framework
may explicitly or implicitly deter MEAs, since international cooperation is required to limit carbon dioxide
6The authors are grateful to Andrew Rose for making the data available (http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/).
7For all estimated models there was a sufficient overlap in the distribution of propensity scores for treated and controls.
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emissions give that it is purely a global externality.
In terms of deforestation, there are two primary examples of the interplay between the GATT/WTO
and environmental quality. In the dispute Japan - Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, and Fir (SPF)
Dimension Lumber, a Japanese tariff that applied to specific types of dimension lumber was found to be
permissible under the GATT. More recently, Canada has disputed U.S. policies designed to protect the
U.S. lumber industry from allegedly subsidized Canadian lumber in US - Softwood Lumber. Recently, the
WTO Appellate Body has upheld U.S. anti-dumping rates, but a WTO panel also held that the U.S.
countervailing duty determination does not conform to WTO requirements.
Turning to the results, we find that the use of the choice of normalized or unnormalized estimator has
substantially less impact than for per capita carbon dioxide. On the other hand, the exact specification of
the propensity score does have a substantial effect on inference. Specifically, entering each covariate linearly
in the propensity score equation (specification (4)) yields statistically insignificant effects of GATT/WTO
membership on deforestation (τ = 0.18; τnorm = 0.11; standard error = 0.18). Adding quadratic and
cubic terms for each covariate, but excluding any interactions (specification (10)) also yields insignificant
estimates (τ = 0.22; τnorm = 0.20; standard error = 0.15). However, adding interactions between the
linear terms yields statistically significant effects (τ = 0.26; τnorm = 0.30; standard error = 0.14), whereas
moving to the third order linear approximation (specification (19)) yields statistically insignificant estimates
(τ = 0.24; τnorm = 0.22; standard error = 0.15). Thus, we conclude that there is no evidence that
GATT/WTO membership accentuates the annual rate of deforestation. Interestingly, the changes in
inference across the various specifications is solely due to a change in the estimate; the standard errors are
essentially constant. This confirms the results from the Monte Carlo study: there is no efficiency loss from
over-fitting the propensity score.
The next set of results pertain to energy depletion, where a larger value indicates greater energy con-
sumption. As with the previous outcomes, we find that there are important differences across the unnor-
malized and normalized estimates, as well as across the various propensity score specifications. Moreover,
the efficiency of the estimates are not hindered by over-fitting the propensity score. Specifically, we find a
moderately statistically significant effect of GATT/WTO membership on energy conservation when fitting
a third order linear approximation (specification (19)) and using the normalized estimator (τ = −1.65;
τnorm = −1.85; standard error = 1.04), as well as when we omit all interactions, but include third order
polynomials for each covariate (specification (10)) (τ = −2.10; τnorm = −2.27; standard error = 1.06).
However, only including some linear interactions makes the normalized estimate statistically insignificant;
for example, see specification (13) (τ = −1.80; τnorm = −1.43; standard error = 1.02). In the end, using
the normalized weights and over-fitting the propensity score indicates a statistically significant, beneficial
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impact of GATT/WTO membership on energy use, consonant with Frankel and Rose’s (2005) analysis of
trade openness.
In terms of rural and urban access to clean water, we initially note two salient findings. First, the
unnormalized estimates are much larger than the corresponding normalized estimates. For rural (urban)
access, the unnormalized estimates are roughly 1.5 to 2.5 (five to six) times as large. Second, unlike for the
previous three outcomes, the variance of the estimates does vary, sometimes quite substantially, across the
various specifications. For instance, the standard error increase by roughly 270% (225%) from specification
(17) to (19) for rural (urban) water access. This may be attributable to the smaller sample of countries for
which data on clean water access are available, combined with the fact that water access is time invariant in
1990 and 1995 (see Table 2). Thus, the relative costlessness of over-fitting depends crucially on the sample
size and the variation in the outcome. That said, we find a statistically significant effect of GATT/WTO
membership on rural and urban access to clean water using the unnormalized estimator, and moderately
statistically significant effects on rural access to clean water using the normalized estimator, across the
majority of specifications. For example, in the cubic specification (specification (10)), we find statistically
significant effects (rural: τ = 16.94; τnorm = 9.48; standard error = 4.92; urban: τ = 16.59; τnorm = 2.74;
standard error = 5.95).
5 Conclusion
While the use of propensity score methods in the estimation of treatment effects in non-experimental
settings is proliferating, little practical guidance exists for researchers in terms of how one ought to specify
the propensity score model. The perception appears to be that, although under-specifying propensity scores
will yield inconsistent estimates, over-specifying propensity scores is inefficient at best, and inconsistent
at worst. However, this perception need not be correct. Using a Monte Carlo study and two weighting
estimators, we find little penalty to over-fitting propensity scores, and in fact find numerous cases where
over-specifying the model proves beneficial. A secondary result of our analysis is that the normalized
version of the Horvitz-Thompson estimator performs as well as, and sometimes better than, the original
Horvitz-Thompson estimator. As a result, we recommend that researchers report a number of estimates
corresponding to different levels of polynomials used to estimate propensity scores.
Illustrating this approach, we address an important question in the international arena: Does the WTO
hinder environmental improvement? Using data from the 1990s, we find that the WTO is beneficial in
terms of the environmental measures analyzed that are local in nature, and detrimental in terms of those
that are global. Moreover, these results are sensitive to the specification of the propensity score model,
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thus confirming the benefits of comparing the results across numerous propensity score specifications.
Open questions still remain, however. Additional research is called for to further assess the effects
of over-specifying the propensity score model through the inclusion of irrelevant variables. In particular,
there are two types of irrelevant variables: irrelevant higher order terms of relevant variables and variables
that are irrelevant at all orders. Aside from the flat propensity score specification, our Monte Carlo study
focuses only on the former. As such, future work should aim to offer guidance to applied researchers with
respect to the latter.
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A Asymptotic Variance Bound
From Theorem 1 in Hirano et al. (2003):
V = E
[
(τ(X)− τ)2 + σ
2
1(X)
p(X)
+
σ20(X)
1− p(X)
]
where p(x) is the true propensity score evaluated at x, τ(x) = E[Y (1) − Y (0)|X = x], and σ2j (x) =
V [Y (j)|X = x], j = 0, 1.
Our data generating process is:
Yi = β1 + β2Ti + β3Xi + β4TiXi + ei,
where X ∼ U [0, 1] and ei ∼ N(0, σ2).
Thus
Yi(0) = β1 + β3Xi + ei
Yi(1) = Yi(0) + β2 + β4Xi.
Therefore
σ20(x) = σ
2
1(x) = σ
2
τ(x) = E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X = x] = β2 + β4x
τ = E[Y (1)− Y (0)] = β2 + β4 E[X] = β2 + 0.5β4.
From the expressions above
E(τ − τ(X))2 = E(β4(X − 0.5))2 = β24 E(X − 0.5)2 = β24V (X) = β24/12.
Hence
V =
β24
12
+ σ2 E
[
1
p(X)
]
+ σ2 E
[
1
1− p(X)
]
.
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Figure 1: Propensity Scores Specifications
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Table 1.  Monte Carlo Results
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I.  Flat Propensity Score
1000 x Bias -0.62 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.91
Bias (normalized) -0.62 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.91
MSE 1.97 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.33 1.32
MSE (normalized) 1.97 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.32 1.32
Estimated Variance 2.06 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
Propensity MISE 0.0002 0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 0.0012 0.0014 0.0017 0.0019 0.0021 0.0023
  Score SUP 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13
Coverage Unnormalized 0.967 0.954 0.953 0.953 0.951 0.951 0.950 0.950 0.947 0.949
  Rates Normalized 0.967 0.955 0.953 0.953 0.952 0.951 0.950 0.950 0.948 0.949
II.  Linear Propensity Score
1000 x Bias -536.38 1.50 0.10 0.60 0.32 0.48 0.47 -0.84 -1.21 -2.98
Bias (normalized) -536.38 -1.13 -0.71 0.66 -0.07 0.03 -1.43 -2.53 -4.05 -6.27
MSE 289.33 3.30 2.90 2.81 2.88 2.94 2.95 2.98 3.02 3.01
MSE (normalized) 289.33 3.61 3.23 2.88 2.98 3.19 3.04 3.16 3.16 3.18
Estimated Variance 1.65 3.45 2.92 2.92 3.67 6.02 4.14 14.68 8.07 3.40
Propensity MISE 0.1287 0.0027 0.0027 0.0029 0.0030 0.0031 0.0032 0.0034 0.0035 0.0036
  Score SUP 0.49 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12
Coverage Unnormalized 0.000 0.959 0.947 0.952 0.947 0.947 0.942 0.938 0.933 0.934
  Rates Normalized 0.000 0.952 0.935 0.946 0.944 0.955 0.943 0.937 0.931 0.927
III.  Quadratic (Symmetric) Propensity Score
1000 x Bias -0.49 -1.87 -1.54 -4.00 -0.41 -1.06 -3.82 -6.65 -8.25 -9.61
Bias (normalized) -0.49 -0.18 0.02 0.37 0.55 0.50 0.41 0.02 -0.02 -0.08
MSE 3.32 1.45 5.89 5.96 3.46 3.54 3.43 3.32 3.30 3.34
MSE (normalized) 3.32 1.44 3.23 3.28 3.26 3.13 3.11 3.00 2.97 2.97
Estimated Variance 3.15 1.38 8.07 8.38 7.15 27.66 13.01 7.19 6.15 4.11
Propensity MISE 0.1042 0.1041 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.0011 0.0012 0.0013
  Score SUP 0.56 0.58 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Coverage Unnormalized 0.941 0.942 0.966 0.960 0.962 0.951 0.954 0.952 0.946 0.939
  Rates Normalized 0.941 0.944 0.989 0.989 0.965 0.955 0.959 0.962 0.967 0.965
IV.  Quadratic 2 (Asymmetric) Propensity Score
1000 x Bias -595.14 -24.72 -1.78 -2.05 -2.52 -3.66 -4.52 -6.19 -7.78 -9.02
Bias (normalized) -595.14 429.98 -1.44 -1.91 -2.01 -2.12 -2.25 -2.79 -3.15 -3.34
MSE 357.05 10.43 5.00 4.17 3.29 3.36 3.48 3.44 3.54 3.53
MSE (normalized) 357.05 192.02 3.36 3.35 3.12 3.10 3.16 3.19 3.18 3.16
Estimated Variance 2.63 19.72 6.73 6.12 9.99 8.78 23.74 5.59 4.43 4.46
Propensity MISE 0.0880 0.0157 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.0010 0.0011 0.0012
  Score SUP 0.66 0.24 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10
Coverage Unnormalized 0.000 0.986 0.953 0.952 0.953 0.946 0.946 0.942 0.938 0.933
  Rates Normalized 0.000 0.073 0.985 0.967 0.956 0.958 0.951 0.951 0.953 0.949
Notes: MSE = mean squared error; MISE = mean integrated squared error; SUP = sup norm.  Estimated variance uses formula from Hirano et al. (2003). Asymptotic variance bound is 1.32 (Panel I);  
2.49 (Panel II); 2.85 (Panel III); 2.85 (Panel IV).  1,000 simulations used for each column.  See text for further details.
Polynomial Order in Propensity Score Estimation
Table 1 (cont.).  Monte Carlo Results
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
V.  Fourth Order Propensity Score
1000 x Bias -278.61 279.32 26.01 1.69 1.27 1.34 1.12 0.33 -0.32 -1.12
Bias (normalized) -278.61 40.49 -6.97 0.08 1.15 1.15 1.38 1.48 0.80 0.18
MSE 79.61 95.34 4.07 2.89 2.93 2.90 2.93 2.97 2.97 2.97
MSE (normalized) 79.61 6.79 3.05 2.97 2.96 2.88 2.92 2.97 3.01 2.97
Estimated Variance 2.09 111.54 3.66 2.99 3.07 3.12 3.29 9.11 3.22 3.34
Propensity MISE 0.0462 0.0068 0.0008 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0010 0.0011 0.0012
  Score SUP 0.65 0.24 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09
Coverage Unnormalized 0.000 0.996 0.937 0.951 0.946 0.944 0.948 0.947 0.953 0.952
  Rates Normalized 0.000 1.000 0.958 0.942 0.945 0.947 0.947 0.944 0.949 0.945
VI.  Peak (Symmetric) Propensity Score
1000 x Bias 1.89 1.51 51.79 51.37 21.31 21.01 18.26 17.71 9.66 8.57
Bias (normalized) 1.89 2.38 2.69 2.64 2.33 2.48 2.71 2.75 2.43 2.03
MSE 2.45 1.21 5.24 5.29 2.44 2.41 2.87 2.98 2.35 2.22
MSE (normalized) 2.45 1.21 2.09 2.13 1.90 1.88 2.23 2.31 2.09 2.07
Estimated Variance 2.50 1.26 2.86 3.08 1.90 1.89 12.97 25.70 16.97 2.17
Propensity MISE 0.0664 0.0667 0.0036 0.0038 0.0027 0.0029 0.0019 0.0020 0.0019 0.0021
  Score SUP 0.46 0.47 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Coverage Unnormalized 0.956 0.959 0.859 0.870 0.925 0.918 0.945 0.948 0.941 0.937
  Rates Normalized 0.956 0.959 0.971 0.971 0.954 0.951 0.960 0.957 0.952 0.953
VII.  Peak 2 (Asymmetric) Propensity Score
1000 x Bias -269.69 12.96 56.75 -20.55 10.38 10.87 2.96 2.94 2.57 -0.79
Bias (normalized) -269.69 81.38 -17.88 -23.09 -12.53 -13.74 -9.91 -6.02 -5.76 -4.66
MSE 75.06 1.77 7.11 2.30 2.26 2.27 1.92 2.05 2.24 2.00
MSE (normalized) 75.06 8.19 2.67 2.28 2.17 2.27 2.04 2.03 2.05 2.00
Estimated Variance 2.23 1.58 10.42 1.91 2.93 3.86 2.15 4.82 40.96 2.36
Propensity MISE 0.0665 0.0404 0.0134 0.0052 0.0020 0.0021 0.0020 0.0019 0.0020 0.0021
  Score SUP 0.46 0.66 0.31 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11
Coverage Unnormalized 0.000 0.933 0.990 0.932 0.963 0.956 0.953 0.953 0.946 0.946
  Rates Normalized 0.000 0.471 0.978 0.931 0.954 0.950 0.952 0.949 0.946 0.950
Notes: MSE = mean squared error; MISE = mean integrated squared error; SUP = sup norm.  Estimated variance uses formula from Hirano et al. (2003).  Asymptotic variance bound is 2.85 (Panel V); 
1.96 (Panel VI); 1.96 (Panel VII).  1,000 simulations used for each column.  See text for further details.
Polynomial Order in Propensity Score Estimation
Table 1 (cont.).  Monte Carlo Results
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
VIII.  Step (Monotone) Propensity Score
1000 x Bias -222.99 1.21 1.34 -0.77 -0.74 -0.36 -0.34 0.14 0.08 -0.35
Bias (normalized) -222.99 1.40 1.68 -0.86 -0.82 -0.33 -0.37 0.37 0.27 -0.26
MSE 51.68 1.37 1.37 1.36 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.39 1.39 1.38
MSE (normalized) 51.68 1.40 1.37 1.36 1.36 1.37 1.37 1.39 1.39 1.38
Estimated Variance 1.98 1.40 1.40 1.39 1.39 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40
Propensity MISE 0.0188 0.0024 0.0026 0.0025 0.0027 0.0028 0.0030 0.0028 0.0030 0.0028
  Score SUP 0.18 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14
Coverage Unnormalized 0.001 0.952 0.953 0.951 0.953 0.954 0.956 0.957 0.956 0.955
  Rates Normalized 0.001 0.953 0.954 0.951 0.950 0.952 0.954 0.957 0.957 0.956
IX.  Step 2 (Non-Monotone) Propensity Score
1000 x Bias 265.03 -158.92 88.60 598.09 35.58 145.28 -32.42 -7.27 -82.26 -99.81
Bias (normalized) 265.03 -73.83 -79.98 -124.15 -38.46 -42.91 -14.86 -15.17 -7.67 -2.10
MSE 72.41 27.31 17.01 2138.43 5.40 28.99 5.36 7.81 12.79 16.62
MSE (normalized) 72.41 6.88 11.31 33.53 4.36 5.99 3.25 4.38 3.70 3.57
Estimated Variance 2.30 2.36 79.34 4.03E+08 4.34 27.79 4.92 8129.52 15.49 16.69
Propensity MISE 0.1069 0.0832 0.0361 0.0329 0.0194 0.0166 0.0123 0.0105 0.0102 0.0099
  Score SUP 0.41 0.49 0.43 0.47 0.42 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
Coverage Unnormalized 0.000 0.058 0.995 0.998 0.938 0.892 0.939 0.974 0.963 0.960
  Rates Normalized 0.000 0.717 0.916 0.971 0.937 0.971 0.975 0.985 0.992 0.997
Notes: MSE = mean squared error; MISE = mean integrated squared error; SUP = sup norm.  Estimated variance uses formula from Hirano et al. (2003).  Asymptotic variance bound is 1.40 (Panel VIII); 
2.50 (Panel IX).  1,000 simulations used for each column.  See text for further details.
Polynomial Order in Propensity Score Estimation
Table 2.  Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard N Description
Deviation
Per Capita CO2 3.82 4.73 232 Carbon dioxide emissions, industrial, in metric tons
per capita
Deforestation 0.68 1.28 223 Annual deforestation, average percentage change,
1990 - 1995
Energy Depletion 3.13 7.43 223 In percent of GDP, equal to the product of unit
resource rents and the physical quantities of fossil 
fuel energy extracted
Rural Water Access 51.2 27.42 137 Access to clean water, percentage of rural
population, 1990 - 1996
Urban Water Access 76.28 21.76 140 Access to clean water, percentage of urban
population, 1990 - 1996
GATT/WTO (1 = Yes) 0.78 0.41 232 Member country of GATT/WTO
Real GDP Per Capita 7302.91 7468.41 232 Real (1990) gross domestic product divided by 
population
Polity 3.17 6.85 232 Index, ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10
(strongly democratic)
Area Per Capita 51.60 89.56 232 Land area divided by population
Source:  Environmental indicators and country-level controls are from Frankel and Rose (2002, 2005); GATT/WTO membership data are from
Rose (2004a, 2005).  N  = number of observations.  Observations from 1990 and 1995.  See http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/. 
Table 3.  Impact of GATT/WTO Membership on Environmental Quality
Additional Standard HIR Standard
Specification Variable τ τ norm Error τ τ norm Std Error τ τ norm Error
(1) constant 1.56 1.56 0.58 -0.03 -0.03 0.20 -4.57 -4.57 1.54
(2) x1 0.94 0.42 0.64 0.18 0.12 0.18 -3.49 -4.16 1.33
(3) x2 0.82 0.27 0.71 0.19 0.13 0.18 -3.50 -4.16 1.33
(4) x3 0.87 0.33 0.69 0.18 0.11 0.18 -3.09 -3.69 1.20
(5) x1
2 1.72 1.03 0.53 0.21 0.27 0.15 -2.10 -1.60 1.14
(6) x2
2 1.77 1.06 0.50 0.21 0.26 0.15 -2.19 -1.76 1.14
(7) x3
2 1.78 1.05 0.49 0.21 0.21 0.15 -2.22 -2.18 1.07
(8) x1
3 1.77 1.04 0.50 0.21 0.23 0.15 -2.14 -1.94 1.06
(9) x2
3 1.74 1.02 0.51 0.22 0.21 0.15 -2.09 -2.20 1.07
(10) x3
3 1.75 1.02 0.50 0.22 0.20 0.15 -2.10 -2.27 1.06
(11) x1*x2 1.75 1.01 0.49 0.24 0.29 0.14 -1.99 -1.52 1.06
(12) x1*x3 1.75 1.01 0.50 0.26 0.33 0.14 -1.71 -1.12 0.96
(13) x2*x3 1.77 1.04 0.48 0.26 0.30 0.14 -1.80 -1.43 1.02
(14) x1
2*x2 1.80 1.04 0.47 0.25 0.22 0.14 -1.76 -2.08 1.10
(15) x1
2*x3 1.79 1.03 0.46 0.25 0.20 0.14 -1.72 -2.22 1.10
(16) x2
2*x1 1.79 1.03 0.47 0.25 0.20 0.14 -1.72 -2.22 1.09
(17) x2
2*x3 1.78 1.00 0.48 0.25 0.20 0.14 -1.72 -2.22 1.09
(18) x3
2*x1 1.69 0.86 0.52 0.25 0.21 0.14 -1.68 -1.97 1.06
(19) x3
2*x2 1.69 0.91 0.52 0.24 0.22 0.15 -1.65 -1.85 1.04
Notes: The propensity score equation in specification (1) contains only a constant.  Each specification after that includes the variables from the previous specification plus the additional 
variable.  x1 is real GDP; x2 is area per capita; and, x3 is a measure of polity.  See text for further details.
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Table 3 (cont.).  Impact of GATT/WTO Membership on Environmental Quality
Additional Standard Standard
Specification Variable τ τ norm Error τ τ norm Error
(1) constant 8.85 8.85 5.09 2.14 2.14 4.54
(2) x1 10.08 6.24 5.64 5.72 -1.64 6.38
(3) x2 12.29 7.72 5.24 7.94 -0.95 6.37
(4) x3 12.35 8.01 5.29 6.93 -1.59 6.20
(5) x1
2 17.12 10.24 4.67 16.55 3.18 5.27
(6) x2
2 17.11 8.79 4.63 17.91 2.49 5.27
(7) x3
2 17.31 9.58 4.62 17.49 2.86 5.53
(8) x1
3 17.27 9.55 4.64 17.51 2.86 5.60
(9) x2
3 16.88 9.54 4.88 16.55 2.84 5.96
(10) x3
3 16.94 9.48 4.92 16.59 2.74 5.95
(11) x1*x2 16.90 9.08 4.93 17.71 2.90 5.43
(12) x1*x3 16.71 8.73 4.86 17.74 2.66 5.33
(13) x2*x3 15.74 8.93 8.73 15.95 2.69 8.18
(14) x1
2*x2 15.69 8.06 6.79 18.12 3.34 6.17
(15) x1
2*x3 17.04 7.25 4.91 21.11 3.12 5.46
(16) x2
2*x1 17.14 7.34 4.88 21.34 3.07 5.63
(17) x2
2*x3 18.35 8.09 4.74 22.52 3.25 5.66
(18) x3
2*x1 18.87 7.48 11.24 24.19 3.87 9.79
(19) x3
2*x2 18.51 7.64 12.77 23.01 3.72 12.68
Notes: The propensity score equation in specification (1) contains only a constant.  Each specification after that includes the variables from the previous specification plus the additional 
variable.  x1 is real GDP; x2 is area per capita; and, x3 is a measure of polity.  See text for further details.
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